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This article examines individual and social influences on investments in health and
enjoyment from immediate consumption. Our lab experiment mimics the problem of
health investment over a lifetime (Grossman, 1972a,b). Incentives to find the appropriate
expenditures on life enjoyment and health are given by making in each period come
period a function of previous health investments. In order to model social effects in the
experiment, we randomly assigned individuals to chat/observation groups. Groups were
permitted to freely chat between repeated lifetimes. Two treatments were employed:
In the Independent-rewards treatment, an individual’s rewards from investments in life
enjoyment depend only on his choice and in the Interdependent-rewards treatment;
rewards not only depend on an individual’s choices but also on their similarity to the
choices of the others in their group, generating a premium on conformity. The principal
hypothesis is that gains from conformity increase variance in health behavior among
groups and can lead to suboptimal performance. We tested three predictions and
each was supported by the data: the Interdependent-rewards treatment (1) decreased
within-group variance, (2) increased between-group variance, and (3) increased the
likelihood of behavior far from the optimum with respect to the dynamic problem. We
also test and find support for a series of subsidiary hypotheses. We found: (4) Subjects
engaged in helpful chat in both treatments; (5) there was significant heterogeneity among
both subjects and groups in chat frequencies; and (6) chat was most common early
in the experiment, and (7) the interdependent rewards treatment increased strategic
chat frequency. Incentives for conformity appear to promote prosocial behavior, but also
increase variance among groups, leading to convergence on suboptimal strategies for
some groups. We discuss these results in light of the growing literature focusing on social
networks and health outcomes.
Keywords: behavioral economics, health economics, experimental economics, health knowledge, attitudes,
practice, dynamics programming
Introduction
Inequalities in health, across and within populations, are a major public concern, but the causal
processes underlying social effects on health remain incompletely understood and subject to much
debate (see, for example, Weinstein and Lane, 2014 for a recent collection of papers commissioned
by the National Academy Sciences to address those processes). There are large ethnic differences
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in both life expectancy within the U.S. For example, in the
1990s the life expectancy of Native American males was 56 years
in some counties, while that of Asian American women was
95 years in other counties (Murray et al., 1999). While several
critical variables such as income and education help explain these
differences, significant variance remains unexplained (Cutler and
Lleras-Muney, 2010). There are significant national differences
in health-related behavior, such as obesity (Finucane et al., 2011)
and those differences vary by gender (Kanter and Caballero,
2012). There are also regional differences in the U.S. with obesity
being greater in the central states compared to the east and
west coasts (Kelley et al., 2015). There are also ethnic differences
that interact with socio-economic status and sex (Jackson et al.,
2013; Hernandez and Pressler, 2014). In fact, health-related
behaviors such as exercise, dietary habits, and smoking and
alcohol consumption, have been calculated to explain about
40–50% percent of premature mortality, as well as substantial
morbidity and disability, in the United States (McGinnis et al.,
2002).
Empirical evidence shows that social groups influence health
behavior in complex ways. Peer pressure can help individuals
control health habits (Umberson et al., 2010). For example,
spouses or religious communities may monitor, inhibit, regulate,
or facilitate the health behavior of their partners or members of
their community (Waite, 1995; Ellison and Levin, 1998). Group
effects alternatively might lead individuals to engage in risk-
taking and increased alcohol consumption. In addition, there
seem to be matching effects; for example, having an obese spouse
or friend can increase an individual’s likelihood of being obese
(Crosnoe et al., 2004; Christakis and Fowler, 2007). There is a
growing body of literature concerned with the way in which
social networks influence health-related behavior (Crosnoe et al.,
2004; Christakis and Fowler, 2007; Hutchinson and Rapee, 2007;
Ajilore et al., 2014; Girard et al., 2014; Shimizu et al., 2014;
Tucker et al., 2014; Nam et al., 2015). Yet, despite the extensive
evidence of group influence in health behavior, little is known
of the precise mechanisms by which groups influence individual
choices (Cruwys et al., 2015). Identifying the social causes of
behavioral change from naturally occurring data is difficult due
to selection biases and unobserved heterogeneity associated with
group formation (Fowler et al., 2011). In addition, interactions
between individuals and groups that affect health behavior are
usually unobserved.
The principal hypothesis motivating the experiments this
paper reports is that social influences increase variance in health
behavior among groups, resulting in these “cultural” differences in
health. We propose that social effects derive from two principle
routes. First, people utilize observation of behavior and engage
in direct communication about practices and strategies in order
to be better able to achieve their goals. Providing advice and
educating others is an intrinsically human and pro-social activity.
Humans have been providing advice regarding health behavior
for millennia (Kleinman, 1980), and now they can even provide
advice to strangers on the Internet (Constant et al., 1996; Swan,
2012).
A second route for social effects derives from the increased
utility people gain by the extent to which their choices conform
to those of others, with whom they interact and identify. We
propose that this route is a major driver producing variance
among groups. Many of the activities that can compromise
health, such as smoking and consuming large amounts of food
or alcohol, are often done in group contexts (Pliner and Mann,
2004; Blake et al., 2011). This is why weight gain is particularly
concentrated during the end-of-year holiday season (Yanovski
et al., 2000). We propose that individuals, who refrain from
such group activities for health reasons, when they are common
in their social network, suffer social costs, both because they
are rejecting the social norm and because they are forgoing
opportunities to invest in affiliative social bonds. For example,
a large meta-analysis of 69 eligible experiments showed strong
evidence that eating behavior is modeled in social groups, and
that modeling is enhanced when individual desire to affiliate
with the model. Alcohol consumption in groups has been shown
to increase social bonding (Sayette et al., 2012), forays to local
bars for communal drinking are common in many cultural and
occupational groups (e.g., Duke et al., 2013; Pillai et al., 2013).
Our hypothesis is that socio-cultural variation in health outcomes
is partially driven by conformity biases is these kinds of health-
related behaviors, and that those biases will amplify variation
among groups.
To test this hypothesis, this article examines individual and
social influences on investments in health and enjoyment from
immediate consumption in two group contexts. We do this
in a specially framed lab experiment that mimics the problem
of health investment over a lifetime, building on Grossman’s
(1972a,b) theoretical framework to study health investment
choices. Choosing optimal health investments over the life course
is a complex task. Individuals might estimate well the current
costs and benefits of their actions but be less certain of their long-
run effects. In essence, to determine how much time, income
and effort to invest in healthy behavior, individuals have to
solve a dynamic programing problem addressing uncertainty
concerning future income and progressive health degeneration.
In the lab, our subjects experienced an experimental
environment that mimics the previously described health-
investment problem. Each subject lives a nine-period life, during
each period of which he earns income and then invests some
proportion of that income in health and some in life enjoyment.
Subjects earn money in the experiment in proportion to the
sum of the life enjoyment they have consumed. However,
income in each period of life is a function of previous health
investments, so there is a dynamic optimum achievable that
maximizes earnings (aggregate life enjoyment) through the
appropriate investments in life enjoyment and health in each
period. Subjects live eight separate lives during the experiment
with identical parameter values in each life, so they can learn from
experience.
In order to model social effects in the experiment, we
randomly assigned individuals to chat/observation groups,
composed of four subjects each. Between lives, subjects were
allowed to chat with and observe the choices of others in their
chat group. We employed the chat room discussions during
the experiments to study how advice and queries about the
appropriate investment strategies affected behavior. Subjects
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in our experiment, just as individuals in real life, are never
isolated in their ability to compare and assess the quality of
their individual decisions. Our experimental approach in which
chat/observation groups are formed randomly and in which
interactions between the individuals of the groups are recorded,
allows us to analyze whether a mechanism exists that links health
behavior and group communication.
Our experimental design presents two treatments to
investigate social impacts on health. In both treatments,
individual subjects are embedded in social groups of four
individuals that do not change composition throughout the
entire experiment (8 lives). Subjects in both treatments can
observe the choices made by others in their social group and are
permitted to chat with fellow group members. The difference
between the two treatments derives from the relationship
between investments in life enjoyment and experimental
earnings. In our baseline Independent-Rewards treatment, an
individual’s rewards from investments in life enjoyment depend
only on his choices. When rewards are independent of others’
choices, individuals do not have monetary incentives to provide
any advice. However, individuals still have an incentive to search
for advice, and particularly, might be willing to post queries about
strategies, hoping that those who perform better will voluntarily
provide some guidance. Therefore, in the independent-
rewards treatment, an individual’s willingness to provide
advice is mostly generated by their intrinsic motivation to help
others. This mimics the first “purely informational” cultural
route.
In the second Interdependent-Rewards treatment, intended to
mimic environments where strong social norms are impinging
on decision-making, rewards not only depend on an individual’s
choices but also on their similarity to the choices of the others
in their group. Individuals have a payoff function that provides
them incentive to make behavioral choices similar to the other
members of their group (a conformity coefficient). Therefore,
in the interdependent treatment, individuals have a monetary
extrinsic motivation to discuss, agree, and coordinate on life
enjoyment investment, and its correlated investment in health.
The form of this monetary extrinsic motivation is perfectly
known to each subject: a graph shows her precisely how much
her life enjoyment will decrease as the difference between what
she and others in her group invest increases. It is important to
note that the parameters of the experiment were designed such
that the theoretically optimal sequence of decisions was identical
in both treatments, suggesting that any systematic differences
in outcomes observed are attributable to the need for social
coordination in the interdependent treatment and the imperative
nature of the extrinsic motivation to advice. It is possible to
imagine that strong social norms could at times overwhelm the
general health initiative and lead a group to a conforming but
sub-optimal outcome.
This second route may reinforce the optimizing effects of
the first route, but may also lead to multiple equilibria. In
other words, communication, queries and advice regarding
health behavior, can improve health investment and life-
enjoyment choices, but also can lead to suboptimal equilibrium
habits.
The central predictions we test in this paper are:
(1) The conformity payoff in the interdependent-rewards
treatment will decrease within-group variance in behavior.
(2) Due to the possibility of multiple equilibria, the
interdependent treatment will increase among-group
variance in behavior.
(3) The likelihood of poor performance, in terms of optimizing
investments per period over the life course, will be greater in
the interdependent-rewards treatment.
We also test the following subsidiary predictions derived
from the first purely informational route and the added
incentives to communicate when investment rewards are
interdependent in the conformity treatment.
(4) In both treatments, subjects will make queries and provide
strategic advice during chat.
(5) Significant chat heterogeneity will exist between groups,
above the individual heterogeneity of its members, through
processes of observation and information exchange.
(6) Advice and queries will be most common during the first few
lives of the experiment while individuals are most focused on
learning.
(7) Due to incentives, chat about investment behavior will be
more frequent in the interdependent treatment than in the
independent treatment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section The Health
Investment Problem of this paper we describe the health
investment problem precisely as it is presented to the individuals
in our experimental environment. In Subsection Experimental
Environment and Corresponding Theory we illustrate the
decision making task faced by the subjects and outline the
dynamic optimization problem the individual must solve in
order to maximize his aggregate life enjoyment which is
linearly proportional to what he gets paid to participate. In
Subsection Multiple Lives and Chat Groups we discuss the
group structure imposed on subjects and the treatment variable
distinguishing group social conditions. In Section Statistical
Approach we briefly lay out the data structure used to support
our statistical analyses. Section Descriptive Statistics provides
descriptive statistics of the data collected while Section Predictors
of Enjoyment Earnings and Assessment of Social Effects analyzes
predictors of enjoyment earnings and assesses social effects.
Section Discussion and Conclusions discusses the results found
in light of the introduction and intent of this study.
The Health Investment Problem
Experimental Environment and Corresponding
Theory
In the experiments each individual participant worked at a real-
effort harvesting task to earn income and made a sequence of
health and life enjoyment investment decisions in a series of
unrelated lifetimes. Each lifetime was comprised of a sequence of
9 periods (t = 1, 2, . . . 9) of real-effort harvesting activity followed
by investment decision- making. Every lifetime ended after
nine periods, unless the participant’s “health” had degenerated
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to the point of death before then, and the subject’s earnings
for that particular lifetime were computed and added to their
cumulative experimental earnings. After each lifetime ended,
every participant began a new life, until she along with the other
members of group had completed a sequence of 8 lives.
The real effort harvesting task consisted of observing a circular
harvesting field in which a new target would materialize at the
center every second, and capturing the target presented using a
mouse click before it skirted across the boundary. The sequence
of targets varied randomly in value, and once a target was
captured it would take 2 s to process it during which time the
next target that came by was not available for harvesting. At
the beginning of each period subjects also forfeited harvesting
time in proportion to 1minus their current state of health. The
two similar figures displayed in Figure 1 represents what subjects
might have seen during periods 2 and 3 at times when they
could and could not harvest the current target worth 10 that was
skirting across the harvest field.
Notice the bar charts above the two sample harvest fields.
Each green element indicates a target captured and its value. Red
spaces indicate times when the subject was unable to harvest, and
gray indicates inactive or future time.
Once the participant finished the real effort harvesting task in
period t, from which effort she had secured harvest revenue1,
Rt, proportional to current health, she was required to make
investment decisions: howmuch to invest, It, in preserving health
for future harvesting, how much to invest in life enjoyment, Lt,
in order to be paid for her efforts, and how much (if any) to leave
uninvested in a bank account, Bt, that would become available for
future investments in life enjoyment or health. Figure 2 shows
the screen that the subject might have seen after harvesting when
it was time to make her individual investment decisions:
The total amount of revenue that the subject had to invest
($86) was comprised of her harvesting revenue ($70) from the
1For a complete description of the revenue possible and the optimal harvesting
strategy see Supplementary Material.
most recent period in addition to anything remain in her bank
account ($16) from previous periods. There were two graphs
depicting the rates of return on Health and Life investments and
complementary scroll bars beneath each graph that never let the
subject spend more than was available. As she moved the scroll
bars the thermometers to the left of the graphs would indicate
the state of Health and Life Enjoyment that would result from
the given investments. For example, if this subject invested $11
in Health and $75 in Life Enjoyment her Health would increase
to 59 (/100) and she would derive 349 units of Life Enjoyment
with nothing left in her Bank account.
All participants were endowed with a beginning bank balance,
B0, of 0, and should end with a final bank balance, B9, of 0, if
they maximize their total gains from life enjoyment. The budget
constraints governing investment in each period were given by:
It + Lt + Bt = Bt− 1 + Rt ∀t = 1, 2, . . . 9
The precise non-linear return functions for investments in health
and life enjoyment are given below. They were designed to have
diminishing returns to scale, so that the optimal investment
pattern across time would display properties similar to a
Grossman model. The transition equation in our experimental
system relating final health in period t (Ht) to final health in the
previous period (Ht− 1), given an investment (It) in preserving
health, and a natural degeneration (dt) of health that occurred
during period t, was given by:
Ht = Min
[
100, Ht− 1 − dt + 30
1− e−0.025It
1+ e−0.025It
]
A participant could theoretically regenerate health by up to
30 points in any given period if she had accumulated an
“infinite” amount of harvest revenue to invest, but an upper
bound was imposed that prevented the next state of health
from ever exceeding 100. Furthermore, the parameters in the
experimental environment were chosen such that the boundary
FIGURE 1 | Harvesting environment.
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FIGURE 2 | Investment stage environment.
condition, Ht+1 = 100, was never approached under optimal
or “reasonable” decision making. Given the interior solution was
always active, the marginal rate of return on health investment
each period was given by:
dHt
dIt
=
1.5e−0.025It
1+ 2e−0.025It + e−0.05It
Note that at It = 0, dHt/dIt = 3/8 and the rate of return on
each subsequent revenue unit invested in health is independent
of initial state of health (Ht) until health reaches 100. Over many
periods and lifetimes, participants could become very familiar
with the fixed function governing diminishing returns on health
investment.
The earnings equation relating investment in life enjoyment
(Lt) to cash earned (Et) in period t, by a socially independent
participant was given by:
Socially Independent Earnings:
Et = 250 (1+Ht/100)
(
1− e−0.028Lt
)
By convention, in any given period t, degradation of health
occurred after harvesting. Then health investment, Ht, selected
was implemented prior to the life enjoyment investment, Lt,
so that the upgraded state of health would be incorporated
into the life enjoyment computation. The participants
were given graphical representations of the health and life
enjoyment investments that made it very clear that both had
diminishing returns2. The participant’s job was to correctly
2The second derivatives are calculated in the Supplementary Material.
balance investment of harvesting revenue between health and
life enjoyment, each period of her lifetime. To maximize her
earnings across her entire life (periods 1–9) the participant had
to solve the following non-linear program:
Maximize:
∑
t= 1,9
Et =
∑
t= 1,9
250(1+Ht/100)(1− e
−0.028Lt )
Subject to: Bt− 1 + Rt = It + Lt ∀t = 1, . . . 9
Ht = Ht− 1 − dt + 30
1− e−0.025It
1+ e−0.025t
∀ t = 1, . . . 93
Rt = rev(Ht/100) during any active harvest period
4.
The main treatment variable in the experiments reported
determined whether each subject’s earnings from investing in life
enjoyment were interdependent or independent of the decisions
made by other subjects in his social group. Figure 3 shows the
feedback that a subject might see after the investment stage if she
is part of a group whose life enjoyment is socially interdependent:
Notice the subject sees two lines on the Life Investment
graph: the dotted line represents her return if she were socially
independent and the solid line represents her return as a
function of how close her life investment matches/matched
the mean of the other three subjects in her group when she
is socially interdependent. In experiments where subjects are
3Health degeneration dt = {−16, −17, . . . − 23, −24}.
4Rev is a fixed parameter that indicates participant harvesting proficiency. See
Supplementary Material for further discussion.
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FIGURE 3 | Feedback stage interdependent treatment.
interdependent subjects can adjust the location of the apex of
the solid line according to their premonition concerning their
group’s mean investment. After investing they see the actual
choices of others in their group and the resulting payment
function. The legend under the thermometer gives subjects a
verbal explanation of the outcome they observe.
The earnings equation for socially interdependent
participants, relating investment in life enjoyment (Lt) to
cash earned (Et) in period t given the mean investment, Ot, made
by all other subjects in the subject’s social group, is given by:
Socially Interdependent Earnings:
Et = 1.5 ∗
Min (Lt,Ot)
Max (Lt,Ot)
∗ 250(1+Ht/100)(1− e
−0.028Lt )
Note, these earnings were simply computed as the Socially
Independent Earnings multiplied by a ‘conformity multiplier,
1.5 ∗ Min(Lt,Ot)Max(Lt,Ot) . The ratio
Min(Lt,Ot)
Max(Lt,Ot)
measures the proportion by
which the subject’s life enjoyment investment, Lt, matches the
mean life enjoyment investment, Ot, of other members of her
social group. Under interdependence, a subject who conforms to
the group mean in making her life investment choices could earn
a premium of up to 50%, while one that strayed from her group’s
mean (more than 33% below or above) would find herself earning
less than she would if she were not socially bound.
In our environments, the shape of the Health investment
graph would never alter: only the starting point on the Y-axis,
current health, would adjust from period to period. However,
the shape of the Life Enjoyment Investment graph would get
steeper if health deteriorated or flatten if health improved. If
a subject made a poor sequence of investments in which she
neglected maintaining her health, she could die prematurely
before completing harvesting and investing through all nine
periods of life (Figure 4). In such cases before the next harvesting
period began the subject was informed of her inability to
continue.
In the constrained dynamicmaximization problem the subject
must solve, Ht can be rewritten as a function of her initial health,
H0, and investments, It, in health.
Ht = H0 +
∑
k= 1,t −dk + 30
1−e−0.025Ik
1+e−0.025Ik
So solving the
participant’s constrained life enjoyment optimization can be
rewritten as an unconstrained optimization that is a function of
the sequence of health investments Ii and bank deposits Bt
5:
∑
t= 1,9
Et =
∑
t= 1,9
250

1+

H0 + ∑
k= 1,t
−dk + 30
1− e−0.025Ik
1+ e−0.025Ik


/100)
(
1− e−0.028(Bt− 1+Rt−It)
)
5The parameters in the environments we designed were such that the optimal
B∗t was rarely anything other than 0. This considerably reduced the dimension of
the decision making problem faced by participants. On rare occasions, during the
move from harvesting to retirement (periods 6–7), there was aminor improvement
in overall life enjoyment by banking some harvest income to smooth investment
in life enjoyment.
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FIGURE 4 | Dead feedback screen.
This problem is easy to solve numerically for any given period t
when Ht− 1, Bt− 1, Rt and Bt are known
6. The initial conditions
for health and bank balance were given by H0 = 85 and B0 = 0,
the final bank balance B9 must be zero, and Rt is always a linear
function, rev(Ht− 1/100), of previous period’s health. We can
either apply non-linear optimization or dynamic programming
techniques to find the optimal sequence of health investments,
It, and the corresponding maximal aggregate life enjoyment∑
i= 1,9 Et .
It is important to note that under Interdependence, even
with its premium for investment conformity and penalty for
non-conformity, the optimal investment pattern for like-skilled
harvesters is exactly the same as it is under Independence
Table 1 present the optimal investment in Health by period, these
amounts are the same for all treatments. The best that any group
can do is for all individuals to conform to what would otherwise
be the optimal investment pattern for each under Independence:
resulting earnings would simply be multiplied by 1.5.
Using Rt = 87(Ht− 1/100) (we found that 87 was the low
variance, mean skill parameter of all participants), the period
by period optimal Health (Ht) profile that participants should
maintain in order to make health investments (It) that maximize
total life enjoyment (
∑
Et) is given in the following table:
Table 2 table captures a quantitative representation of what
is necessary to maintain this optimal health vector, and hints
at some behavioral difficulties participants might encounter if
their perception of optimal strategy requirements is less than
perfect:
6Supplementary Material provides the example of period 9.
TABLE 1 | Optimal Health (Ht) by period.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
89 91 92 90 86 78 65 42 18
TABLE 2 | Optimal marginal rate of return, % of income invested in health,
by period.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10.0, 86 8.6, 80 7.4, 73 6.3, 67 5.3, 59 4.3, 50 3.3, 35 2.5, 0 2.5, 0
It shows the marginal rates of return for optimal investments
in life enjoyment in each period of life, and implicitly the
rate of return on investment in health and banking for
current and future enjoyment maximization7. It also shows
the percentage of income earned (plus banked8) that must
be devoted to optimal health maintenance in each period of
life.
7This is true for all periods except where a boundary condition is met (only
in periods 8 and/or 9) and the marginal return on any investment in health is
dominated by investment in life enjoyment (Lt) so the optimal investment in health
is zero (It = 0).
8There are only 2 periods in the 36 displayed where it behooves subjects to bank
some earned revenue for the purpose income smoothing: in period 8 of the Flat No
Retirement regime where health will fall precipitously in period 9, and in period 6
of the Tiered Retirement regime where income falls precipitously in period 7, the
first period of retirement.
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Savvy participants must recognize that 86% of earned revenue
from harvesting must be spent on health in period 1, and 80% in
period 2, while the marginal rates of return on investments are
4 times larger than later in life: that skewed optimal investment
strategy is a requirement to be reckoned with in splitting earned
harvest revenues between health and life enjoyment. Late in
life (periods 8 and 9), participants must let go of their health
and spend entirely on life enjoyment. The complete solution for
all decision and state variables are provided in Supplementary
Material.
Multiple Lives and Chat Groups
This nine period dynamic optimization problem faced by subjects
is difficult to solve, due to the non-linearities and interactions
in the health and life enjoyment functions. In order to allow
subjects to learn about the environment and to adjust their
strategies accordingly, subjects lived eight nine-period lives
under identical conditions. This “reincarnation” can be thought
of as a way of modeling cultural traditions in which individuals
learn from previous generations how to best perform in the
environment. In addition, we proposed that in response to
difficult dynamic problems, people would use observational
learning and information exchange to help solve those problems.
Tomodel that process, subjects were divided in four-person chat-
observation groups. Subjects could observe the behavior of three
other subjects (the same three people in each life) and could chat
with them, using text messages, between lives.
Figure 5 shows the chat environment that subjects would see
between lives:
Notice that the subjects could not only communicate with
each other but could also select to see the entire set of actions
(harvesting income, health and life investments period by period)
for all or subjects in their group.
Under Social Independence the chat group provided nothing
more than a venue to exchange information concerning
individual strategy, but under Social Interdependence, the mean
investment in Life Enjoyment by other members of a chat group
became the norm by which investment of each group member
was evaluated and translated into earnings. Interdependence
allowed conformity in investment strategies to enhance earnings
and non-conformity to penalize them. Under Interdependence,
chat provided a venue for both optimizing and conforming
strategies to evolve.
A total of 156 subjects were randomly allocated to 39
chat/observation groups: 68 subjects (17 chat groups) in the
Independent treatment, 88 subjects (22 chat groups) in the
Interdependent treatment. Members of each chat-group were
free to observe and discuss (or not) each other’s performances
for 90 s at the end of each lifetime.
Subjects’ conversations were captured by the messages written
in chat window. Chat lines were classified independently by two
independent research assistants that acted as coders9. Coders
were trained to apply a classification criterion that captures the
presence of strategic advice and queries.
To achieve this goal, coders classified lines into one of four
thematic categories and into one of two linguistic categories.
9Four coders had classified the chat lines of the Independent treatment. To be
consistent with the classification of chat in the Interdependent treatment, we used a
classification based on those coders with inter-reliability rates similar to the coders
of the Interdependent treatment. The classification manual provided to coders is
presented with the additional materials.
FIGURE 5 | Chat environment.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 137
Bejarano et al. Optimization, conformity in health behavior
The thematic categories captured message’s meaning, while
the linguistic category captured the message’s direction
and intention. The four thematic categories were: Income
Generation, Income Allocation, Other Experimental Issues,
Non-Experimental chat. In this article we focus on the second
category: this category includes all those messages in which
subjects expressed ideas or concerns regarding the allocation of
their income to health and life enjoyment. The two linguistic
categories were: Statements or Queries. Chat lines were
assigned to particular class only if both coders agreed on their
classification.
A real example of chat observed over the experiment is
displayed in Figure 5, in this example of dialogs between two
subject P0 (810) requested advice, “How much did you spend in
health?,” this chat line was codified by all of our coders as one
belonging to the categories of, Income Allocation and Queries.
Similarly, P2 (992) responded with two chat lines “I just made
sure my health level was around the same as it was in the
beginning,” “and then I used all the rest on life enjoyment,” these
two lines were classified by all of our coders as Income Allocation
and Statements.
Statistical Approach
In order to handle the repeated and clustered nature of the
experimental design, we employed a mixed fixed and random
effects linear model to analyze the data. Each subject lived eight
lifetimes, having the opportunity to chat with others in her
chat/observation group seven times. During the experiment, each
subject chose 72 times (8 lives × 9 periods) how to allocate
her income between health and life enjoyment investments. The
empirical model takes into account the lack of independence
among observations within and among individuals in groups.
To do this, the model estimates the fixed effects of lifetime,
experimental treatment, and interaction terms, while assessing
the random effects for chat group and individual.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the main variables to be analyzed
are presented in Table 3. For each of the eight “lives” in the
experiment, the table shows the means for total enjoyment
purchased and the number of strategic queries and advice made
per subject during the rest phase following that life during
which chat was allowed. Total enjoyment purchased is the sum
of the amount purchased in each of the nine periods and is
proportional to the actual amount the subject is paid. Those
data are presented in three columns. The first column shows
the means for the treatment group in which each subject’s
rewards from investments in life enjoyment are independent
(that is, the rewards are unaffected by the behavior of other
subjects in the chat group). There are two columns for the
other treatment group in which rewards are interdependent. The
first of those columns (column 2) presents the counterfactual
independent rewards (for comparability purposes) that the
subjects in the interdependent chat groups would have received
if their rewards were independent. The second of those columns
(column 3) presents the rewards they actually received from their
investments, after their interdependence is taken into account
through the conformity multiplier. It is evident from the table
that for both treatment groups, Total Enjoyment Purchased
increases with each life, indicating that their performance
increasingly approached the optimal investment profile across
lives. It is also evident that subjects in the interdependent rewards
treatment group achieved increasingly high levels of conformity
across lives to maximize the multiplier on their investments. The
regression models discussed below will examine these effects in
detail.
The last four columns of Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics
derived from the coding of the chat that occurred during rest
phases between lives. In contrast to earnings which increase over
the course of the experiment, chat queries and advice about
strategy are more frequent following the first few lives, and then
decrease. Interestingly, advice is about four times more common
than queries.
Tables 4, 5 present the results of mixed effect regression
model, with fixed effects for the experimental variables and
random effects for individual and chat/observation group
variables as explanatory variables of strategic queries and advice,
respectively. In both tables, Model I regresses the dependent
variable on the experimental variables life, experimental
treatment (Independent vs. Interdependent rewards), and the
interaction terms that represent the relationship between the
TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics.
Life Total enjoyment purchased Strategic queries Strategic advice
Independent Interdependent w/o conformity Interdependent with conformity Independent Interdependent Independent Interdependent
1 940 1050 1026 0.6 2.7 2.8 8.1
2 1244 1303 1567 0.9 2.5 2.1 11.4
3 1400 1436 1830 0.4 2.3 1.9 8.4
4 1587 1543 2052 0.2 2.8 1.9 7.8
5 1645 1557 2138 0.3 1.7 1.4 6.6
6 1679 1645 2293 0.4 1.3 1.4 5.5
7 1759 1633 2303 0.1 1.0 1.0 5.5
8 1764 1705 2427 n/a
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TABLE 4 | Predictors of strategic queries.
df Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
PARAMETER
Intercept 274 0.26 0.000 0.22 0.014
Life 1† 924 0.41 0.000 0.41 0.000
Life 2 924 0.36 0.000 0.36 0.000
Life 3 924 0.31 0.001 0.31 0.001
Life 4 924 0.43 0.000 0.43 0.000
Life 5 924 0.16 0.097 0.16 0.097
Life 6 924 0.07 0.477 0.07 0.477
Independent Rewards‡ 274 −0.25 0.036 −0.25 0.036
Life 1 * Ind. Rewards∼ 924 −0.26 0.071 −0.26 0.071
Life 2 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.16 0.277 −0.16 0.277
Life 3 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.23 0.108 −0.23 0.108
Life 4 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.4 0.006 −0.4 0.006
Life 5 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.1 0.490 −0.1 0.490
Life 6 * Ind. Rewards 924 0.01 0.971 0.01 0.971
Within group rank 0.02 0.406
COVARIANCE PARAMETERS/RANDOM EFFECTS
Residual 0.4 0.000 0.4 0.000
Chat/obs. Group 0.02 0.101 0.02 0.104
Subject 0.05 0.000 0.05 0.000
†Life parameters are measure against baseline of Life 7.
‡ Interdependent rewards are measured against socially interdependent rewards.
∼ Interaction terms are measured against baselines of socially interdependent rewards and
life 7.
experience and strategic chat. The random effects of this mixed
effect model allow us to control for the influence of individual
subject and chat/observation group. There are strong effects of
life and treatment on both queries and advice, and some of
the interaction terms are significant as well. The interdependent
groups both made more queries and gave more advice than
those with independent rewards, as would be expected by the
gains from coordination and conformity. Relative to the last
lives, strategic chat of both types was greatest early in the
experiment when learning and behavior change was greatest.
Rates of decline in chat during the course of the experiment were
similar, but there were small significant interactions between life
and experimental treatment are weak, but significant; as a result
they are included in the model.
These effects can be seen clearly in Figures 6A,B, which
plot the expected marginal means derived from the Model 1
regressions presented in Tables 4, 5, respectively. On average,
queries about investment strategy are about five times more
frequent and advice is about 4 times more common in the
interdependent than independent rewards treatment. This is
to be expected, given that advice and queries that increase
conformity of investment in life enjoyment have direct monetary
payoffs for those in the interdependent rewards treatment.
However, it is also interesting to note that in both treatments,
advice is about four times more common than are queries. This
is particularly interesting in the case of the independent rewards
TABLE 5 | Predictors of strategic statements.
df Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
PARAMETER
Intercept 76 1.38 0.000 1.98 0.000
Life 1† 924 0.65 0.008 0.65 0.008
Life 2 924 1.48 0.000 1.48 0.000
Life 3 924 0.72 0.004 0.72 0.003
Life 4 924 0.58 0.018 0.58 0.018
Life 5 924 0.28 0.247 0.28 0.244
Life 6 924 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000
Independent Rewards‡ 274 −1.13 0.013 −1.13 0.013
Life 1 * Ind. Rewards∼ 924 −0.21 0.578 −0.21 0.576
Life 2 * Ind. Rewards 924 −1.20 0.001 −1.20 0.001
Life 3 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.50 0.182 −0.50 0.180
Life 4 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.36 0.334 −0.36 0.331
Life 5 * Ind. Rewards 924 −0.18 0.626 −0.18 0.624
Life 6 * Ind. Rewards 924 0.10 0.782 0.10 0.780
Within group rank −0.24 0.000
COVARIANCE PARAMETERS/RANDOM EFFECTS
Residual 2.64 0.000 2.62 0.000
Chat/obs. Group 1.03 0.001 1.06 0.001
Subject 0.71 0.000 0.60 0.000
†Life parameters are measure against baseline of Life7.
‡ Interdependent rewards are measured against socially interdependent rewards.
∼ Interaction terms are measured against baselines of socially interdependent rewards and
life 7.
treatment, because subjects are providing this even though they
do not get any direct monetary benefits from giving advice.
If strategy advice is given to help fellow group members, we
would expect that higher earning individuals would be more
likely to give advice. To test this, Model 2 in Tables 4, 5 adds one
additional explanatory variable to the base Model 1, within-group
earnings rank. This variable, with levels one to four, ranks each of
the four members of the chat/observation group in terms of how
much they earned in the life previous to that chat session (with
one being the highest, and four being the lowest earner). The
results show that high earners are more likely to give advice, with
advice statements decreasing by about 0.24 with each successive
rank. However, rank did not have a significant effect on queries,
which were less common than advice.
The last set of rows in Tables 4, 5 present the random effects,
the residual unaccounted for variance and the effects due to
individual subject and chat group. Some of the unobserved
characteristics of individual subjects and chat groups may
be related to personalities, their willingness to share their
knowledge, and the dialog dynamics that are generated within a
chat group. In the case of queries, there were significant random
effects in subject’s play, but the effects of chat group were not
significant. In the case of strategic advice, both individual and
chat group random effects were significant, and in fact, the
random effects estimate for chat group was slightly greater than
for subject.
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FIGURE 6 | (A) Strategy queries. (B) Strategy advice.
Together, these results support predictions 4–7 above: Subjects
engaged in helpful chat in both treatments (P4); there was
significant heterogeneity among both subjects and groups in chat
frequencies (P5); chat was most common early in the experiment
(P6); and chat was more frequent in the interdependent
treatment (P7).
Predictors of Enjoyment Earnings and
Assessment of Social Effects
Due to the dramatic differences in chat by treatment and the
expectation that the variance within and among chat groups
would differ between the two treatments, we analyze the
Enjoyment Earnings for the two treatment groups, separately.
Similar to the previous analysis, we use a mixed effects
regression models to analyze the determinants of life enjoyment,
strategic chat and life enjoyment. Tables 6, 7 present the results
for the independent- and interdependent- rewards treatments,
respectively. Model 1 presents the baseline model in which
Enjoyment Earnings are regressed on life alone. Model 2 adds
an additional variable, Total Strategic Chat, to examine whether
verbal exchanges over strategy improved earnings in the next
life. Total Strategic Chat is the sum of both queries and advice
statements over all four members of the group following a given
life.
For the independent rewards treatment, Table 6 shows that
for the base Model 1 earnings increase by almost 90% during
the course of the experiment from 940 in life 1 to 1764 in
life 8. Model 2 shows that Total Strategic Chat did not have a
significant effect on earnings. However, the random effects terms
do show appreciable group level random effects, suggesting that
observing other group members’ play and/or the chat did have
effects on behavior. Nevertheless, the estimates for random effects
at subject’s level were a little more than three times as high as for
chat groups (35,053 vs. 10,818).
Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of the
regression models for the interdependent treatment: both for the
counterfactual earnings without the conformity multiplier and
the actual earnings, taken into account the conformity effect.
TABLE 6 | Enjoyment earnings without socially dependent rewards.
Model 1 Model 2
df Estimate Sig. df Estimate Sig.
PARAMETER
Intercept 39 1764 0.000 36 1761 0.000
Life 1 469 −824 0.000 1
Life 2 469 −520 0.000 407 −526 0.000
Life 3 469 −364 0.000 405 −369 0.000
Life 4 469 −176 0.000 403 −179 0.000
Life 5 469 −119 0.004 402 −122 0.003
Life 6 469 −85 0.037 402 −86 0.031
Life 7 469 −5 0.896 402 −7 0.860
Total strategic chat 397 2 0.638
COVARIANCE PARAMETERS/RANDOM EFFECTS
Residual 56,204 0.000 53,691 0.000
Chat/obs. Group 35,053 0.000 41,606 0.000
Subject 10,817 0.167 11,095 0.199
1 Because Chat periods only occur after Life 1, Model 2 does not include Enjoyment
Earnings for life 1.
From the Model 1 analysis, we see that earnings also increase
from life to life, starting from a mean of 1050 in life 1 and
ending with mean of 1704 in life 8 without the conformity
multiplier, and from 1026 to 2427 with the multiplier. Adding
Total Strategic Chat in Model 2, we see that it has no significant
effect on earnings without the multiplier, but a large effect with
the multiplier.
Taken together, the results in Tables 6, 7 suggest that we
cannot detect an effect of chat on solving the dynamic problem
of optimizing investments over the nine-period life course, but
we can detect an effect of chat on improving earnings through
the conformity multiplier. In other words, subjects were able to
coordinate their strategies and make similar investments in each
period; the chat appears to have facilitated this coordination.
Figure 7 illustrates these effects by plotting the expected
marginal means for enjoyment earnings from the Model 1
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TABLE 7 | Enjoyment earnings with socially dependent rewards.
Model 1 Model 2
df Interdependent Interdependent df Interdependent Interdependent
w/o conformity with conformity w/o conformity with conformity
Estimate Sig. Est. Sig. Est. Sig. Est. Sig.
PARAMETER
Intercept 32 1705 0.000 2427 0.000 31 1698 0.000 2390 0.000
Life 1 609 −655 0.000 −1401 0.000 1
Life 2 609 −402 0.000 −860 0.000 522 −406 0.000 −882 0.000
Life 3 609 −269 0.000 −597 0.000 523 −276 0.000 −639 0.000
Life 4 609 −162 0.000 −375 0.000 522 −166 0.000 −399 0.000
Life 5 609 −148 0.000 −289 0.000 522 −152 0.000 −310 0.000
Life 6 609 −60 0.080 −134 0.006 522 −62 0.055 −143 0.002
Life 7 609 −72 0.036 −124 0.011 522 −72 0.025 −124 0.007
Total strategic chat 541 1 0.473 5 0.005
COVARIANCE PARAMETERS/RANDOM EFFECTS
Residual 51,678 0.000 102,943 0.000 45,205 0.000 92,560 0.000
Chat/obs. Group 11,533 0.000 10,179 0.013 13,567 0.000 14,248 0.003
Subject 42,449 0.003 133,297 0.002 51,138 0.003 157,171 0.002
1 Because Chat periods only occur after Life 1, Model 2 does not include Enjoyment Earnings for life 1.
FIGURE 7 | Cumulative lifetime enjoyment, expected marginal means.
regressions in Tables 6, 7. Earnings for both treatments increase
with each progressive life, and are very similar on average for
the two treatments, when the conformity bias is not taken
into account. However, the interdependent chat groups also
increasingly took advantage of the conformity multiplier (as can
be seen by the increasing distance between the red and orange
lines).
The dramatic effects of introducing interdependence in
rewards can be seen from the variance decomposition of the
random effects. As opposed to the independent rewards case
where the chat group random effects were one third as large
as the individual subject random effects, they were 13 times
larger (133,297 vs. 10,179) in the case of actual enjoyment
earnings in the interdependent case. The ratios of the within
and between group variances reverse moving from independent
to interdependent rewards. The differences between the two
treatments were highly significant (p < 0.0001), for both within-
group variance (higher in the independent rewards treatment)
and between-group variance (higher in the interdependent
treatment).
Those effects are illustrated in Figure 8A shows the mean
standard deviation of enjoyment investment within groups for
the two treatments. It demonstrates the dramatic reduction in
within group variance in investments in the interdependent-
rewards treatment. By life 2, subjects have managed to coordinate
their investments appreciably, with the lowest variances to
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FIGURE 8 | (A) Mean standard deviation of enjoyment investment within groups. (B) Standard deviation of the mean enjoyment investment among groups.
be found in lives 7 and 8. Figure 8B shows the standard
deviation of mean investments among groups (for each period
and each group, the mean of investments is first calculated,
and the standard deviations of those means among groups
are calculated). Here, the dramatic increase in variance among
groups due to the conformity effect in the interdependent
treatment is also visible by life 2.
Finally, to ask whether the conformity effect might lead some
groups to converge on suboptimal strategies, we examined the
likelihood of being in the bottom quartile of earnings at the level
of the chat group. Tomake the data comparable, we used the total
enjoyment purchased for the groups in each treatment, ignoring
the conformity multiplier. Those results are presented in Table 6,
using data from lives 7 and 8 when earnings in both treatments
were highest.
Table 8 shows that just over a third of the chat groups
in the interdependent rewards treatment were in the lowest
quartile of mean earnings (15/44), whereas only 11% were in
the lowest quartile in the independent treatment, leading to
an odds ratio of about 3. These results suggest that the focus
on social conformity in investment in life enjoyment not only
increased variance among groups, but also resulted in some
groups stabilizing at behavioral strategies quite far from optimal
dynamic performance.
Figure 9 examines this possibility by comparing observed
investment behavior with optimal investment behavior. A visual
inspection of the figure suggests that subjects in the independent
rewards treatment converged more on the optimal strategy on
average than those in the interdependent treatment. Unlike
the theoretical optimum, investments in life enjoyment in the
interdependent treatment tend to remain flat rather than increase
throughout life, and investments in health decrease much less
than is optimal.
Together, these results support predictions 1–3 with the
interdependent treatment decreasing within-group variance (P1)
but increasing between-group variance (P2), more frequently
resulting in behavior far from the optimum with respect to the
dynamic problem (P3).
Discussion and Conclusions
These findings support the central hypothesis motivating this
paper: incentives for conformity promote prosocial behavior,
TABLE 8 | Cumulative earnings in the lowest quartile.
Lowest quartile Treatment group Total
enjoyment earnings
Independent Interdependent
No 30 29 59
Yes 4 15 19
Total 34 44 78
but also increase variance among groups in equilibrium
outcomes, leading to a higher probability of convergence
on suboptimal strategies. This tension between gains from
conformity and individual optimization may help explain the
striking variability in health behavior across regions, ethnic
groups and socioeconomic strata. The social costs and benefits
of cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, physical exercise, and
eating patterns are likely to vary with respect to their frequency
in the networks in which individuals are embedded. From a social
perspective, overweight or over-exercise, for that matter, may be
relative terms.
These findings are related to the growing literature on
social network effects on health and on the growing obesity
epidemic. A particularly related paper (Strulik, 2014) concerns
how exogenous shifters in the effective costs of food interact with
social effects to generate progressive effects on health that are
longer term and larger than would be expected from economic
considerations alone. Focusing on the fact that increases in
obesity postdate by more than a decade the decreases in the
costs of food, the paper presents a theoretical model that posits
a trade-off between the enjoyment utility of eating and the social
disutility of being overweight and being considered less attractive.
It shows that an exogenous shifter in the costs of food, which
would increase food consumption at the optimum, would at first
generate a small increase in overweight that would becoming
increasingly larger through time due to social effects. As people
gain weight, the social disutility of being fatter than the average
shifts with the shifting average. That paper also shows that the
exogenous shifters can interact with SES effects on food and
non-food consumption to increase SES differences in obesity.
Our results suggest that “cultural” differences in norms will also
interact with such economic considerations to possibly generate
even greater variance among groups and social networks.
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FIGURE 9 | Observed and theoretically optimal investment strategies.
These results are also consistent with the growing body of
evidence on social network effects on health-related behavior.
For example, while there is strong evidence of “hemophilic”
self-selection in social network formation and maintenance
with like types assorting together (e.g., Christakis and Fowler,
2007; Hutchinson and Rapee, 2007), there is also evidence
that experimentally-induced random assignment to networks
can influence behavior as well. For example, Girard et al.
(2014) observed naturalistic network formation among college
students, but also experimentally induced network ties among
students. They found that students’ formation of social networks
was influenced by both homophilic considerations and the
characteristics of the partners with whom they were randomly
assigned. Regional and ethnic variation in health behavior
probably reflects both the random effects of the social network
one is born into and subsequent self-selection processes. Future
experiments will allow us to combine random and endogenous
partner formation in controlled ways to determine their relative
effects. Another related paper (Ajilore et al., 2014) utilizes spatial
econometrics to decompose social effects on weight outcomes
into social “multiplier” (enhancement) and social norm effects,
respectively; they define the social multiplier effect as “change
in behavior of any one individual in the peer group spreads to
the other members of the group, (whereas) with the social norm
effect, individuals conform to the average behavior of the entire
peer group.” They found stronger effects of norms on BMI and of
social multiplier on overweight status. Our experiment combines
those two effects in the conformity multiplier. However, in our
experimental context, future work can analyze multiplier and
normative effects separately through different rewards functions.
A recent study (Daw et al., 2013) found that the serotonin
transporter–linked polymorphic region (5HTTLPR), a gene
associated with environmental sensitivity, moderates the
association between smoking and drinking patterns at
adolescents’ schools and their corresponding risk for smoking
and drinking themselves. They concluded that an individual’s
susceptibility to school-level patterns of smoking or drinking
is conditional on the number of short alleles he or she has
in 5HTTLPR. This result suggests that one fruitful future
direction for experimental laboratory-based research might be
to combine genetic analysis of allele frequencies of subjects
with both changing dynamic optimization problems and social
manipulations.
All of our subsidiary predictions (4–7) regarding chat, were
supported. Helpful chat was common in both treatments, with
significant heterogeneity among groups and most chat being
concentrated early in the experiment. Strategic chat was much
more frequent in the interdependent rewards (conformity)
treatment.
In the independent-rewards treatment, there were no
monetary incentives for subjects to help (or mislead) others in
finding the optimal strategy of investments, nor were subjects
given instructions about what they could discuss between lives.
About one third of chat messages communicated concerned
harvesting strategies, while two thirds were directed toward
optimal investment (about 2 messages per life). Most messages
delivered advice rather than a query concerning strategy.
Individualmonetary incentivesmight explain queries, but are less
likely to explain advice. A subject who earned more than others
in her chat group was more likely to provide strategic advice, but
was no more likely to make a query. This suggests that better
earners were intrinsically motivated to help those who did worse.
The interdependent rewards treatment provided a strong
extrinsic monetary incentive for subjects to coordinate on
behavior. This motivation resulted in both absolutely more
strategy chat and a greater relative emphasis on strategy than on
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other topics. People in the interdependent treatment sent about
four times as many strategy messages as the independent rewards
treatment, but they sent fewer messages about topics outside
the experiment (1.2 vs. 3 messages on average per life per chat
group). Just as in the independent treatment, higher earners in
the interdependent dependent treatment offered more strategic
advice than lower earners, and advice was much more common
than queries.
With respect to the impacts of chat on dynamic optimization,
results were largely negative. There were no significant effects of
chat quantity on earnings in the independent-rewards treatment.
In the case of the interdependent rewards, we also found
no significant effects of chat on earnings without taking into
account the conformity multiplier. However, actual earnings,
taking into account the multiplier, were positively associated
with the number of strategy chat messages sent in a life. Chat
appears to have facilitated conformity to one strategy, rather than
investment optimization over the life course.
The dynamic optimization problem subjects faced was
particularly complex and non-linear. They showed through their
behavior that they were able to improve their performance over
time, but it may have been difficult to put those improvements
into words in simple chat messages, so quantity of messages
without reference to quality is a poor measure of information
flow. Nevertheless, significant social learning still appears to have
occurred, given the significant random effects of chat groups on
earnings and investments in both health and life enjoyment.
Perhaps, the gains from conformity can compete with other
strategic problems individuals face, more generally. In the face
of uncertainty, doing what most others do (positive frequency
dependent modeling) can often be the best strategy, since it
integrates information across individuals and over time (Boyd
and Richerson, 1988; Henrich and McElreath, 2003). Moreover,
activities that provide enjoyment utility at a potential cost to
health, such as smoking, alcohol consumption, and excessive
eating, are often done in social contexts. Thus, the variant
individual who chooses to avoid those activities and invest in
health and a substitute activity will forego opportunities for social
exchange at the same time. It is likely that the extrinsic monetary
payoff for social conformity imposed by our experiment does
not adequately model the intrinsic emotional, moral and status-
related dimensions of social conformity motivating individual
behavior. It may not be surprising that this experimental
intervention decreased within-group variance. However, it is
striking that the intervention dramatically increased among
group variance, as predicted by our hypothesis. There was no
extrinsic monetary payoff for among group variance; in fact,
variance away from the optimal strategy was economically costly.
The processes generating varying social equilibria in health
behavior and status merit further investigation. Behavioral
economic experiments that focus on the interplay of dynamic
optimization problems and social forces are likely to provide
new insights into why so many different equilibria are observed,
and may be particularly productive in explaining changing
patterns of health. For example, the question of heterogeneous
skill/income levels would pose a serious problem when strong
social norms are in place. In the experiments reported, after a
few periods of harvesting experience, subjects became very good
at harvesting near optimally. Furthermore, in our experiments,
the naive harvesting policy (take the next target whatever it is)
performed 97% efficiently if implemented with perfect vigilance.
Therefore, differences in income due to heterogeneity in skill
levels were minimized. This was exactly as we intended; the task
required vigilance and real effort but resulted in low variance in
subject disposable income. This made joint decision-making in
the social conformity treatment less subject to the complexity that
results with group member wealth disparities. Most inefficiency,
and there was not a lot, was simply due to lack of vigilance.
Experimental environments can easily be created to allow
for a controlled experimental environment in which subjects’
inherent skill sets (e.g., hand/eye coordination) can produce
heterogeneous income profiles. We will run that experiment after
constructing an environment that also provides a mechanism
for conformity groups to form and reform endogenously. That
more complicated environment will be implemented in the next
generation of experimentation.
Many other validity issues can be addressed under controlled
laboratory conditions. For example, lifetime length duration and
individual discounting issues will be considered by employing a
much extended time horizon (web-based experiments that run
months rather than hours), a much higher number of decision
points during any lifetime, and the real temptation to abscond
with continuously available electronic payoffs for the purpose
of real life enjoyment during the course of the experimental
lifetime. Individual risk attitudes toward health preservation will
become influential when we introduce stochastic shocks to health
and the possibility of purchasing reparative insurance. Social
impingement on health-creating activities will be implemented
through tedious real labor tasks that can be abbreviated through
subject coordinated on-line co-participation. Similarly, subject
arranged simultaneity of on-line activity will be used to amplify
enjoyment derived from leisure tasks (browsing). Understanding
what we have observed and discovered in the experiments
reported in this article will allow us to directly confront many
validity questions in the next generation of laboratory controlled
health decision experiments.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnbeh.
2015.00137/abstract
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